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Energy security is sometimes used to advocate renewable energy systems. Renewable energy systems
can improve some aspects of security, but they will not automatically lead to the removal of all types of
security problems and new problems will most certainly arise. This paper analyses energy security as-
pects of renewable energy systems on the basis of a broad typology on energy and security. Renewable
energy sources do not suffer from the same long-term resource availability problems as ﬁnite fossil
resources and their geographical location is less concentrated, but other issues such as dependence on
variable ﬂowing resources and competition for scarce land resources will grow in importance. Many
security issues related to energy are also dependent on the energy carrier rather than the energy
resource and on the existence of effectively functioning institutions and regulations. New in-
terdependencies will appear and will have to be handled within future international and bilateral
institutional frameworks.
 2013 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
The global energy system is dominated by fossil fuels. RE
(Renewable energy)1 currently contributes around 13% of total
global primary energy supply [2] but the fraction is growing. In the
EU, RE contributes around 11% of total energy [2], but its impor-
tance varies signiﬁcantly between member countries. For example
in Sweden and Finland, RE contributed 47% and 30% of total gross
ﬁnal energy, respectively, in 2009, while in other countries such as
the UK and the Netherlands only a few per cent of total energy was
supplied by RE in that year [3]. These differences are the result of
variations in geographical conditions, energy system designs and
political priorities..johansson@miljo.lth.se.
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Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-NDEU energy policy is built on three pillars: competitiveness, se-
curity of supply and sustainability [4]. Although the expansion of RE
is often motivated by its potential to reduce climate change, energy
security has also been a strong driver for RE policy [5] As part of its
energy and climate policy, the EU has issued a directive which re-
quires member states to contribute to doubling RE from the 2005
level up to 20% of gross ﬁnal energy consumption by 2020 [6]. In the
longer term, this share could increase even more. In the scenarios
developed for the EU energy roadmap [7], which envisage an
emissions reduction of 80% by 2050 compared with 1990, the RE
fraction varies between 55 and 75% of gross ﬁnal energy
consumption.2
The main body of literature on energy security focuses on the
geopolitics and dependencies of fossil fuels (especially oil and gas),
and the functionality of electricity systems. The security aspects of
RE are seldom analysed and there is a signiﬁcant research gap in
this ﬁeld [8], although there are a few reports and papers dealing
with some aspects of the relationship between RE and energy se-
curity (e.g. Refs. [9e11]). There are several characteristics that make
RE quite different from many fossil fuels: the dependence on ﬂows
rather than exhaustible stock, the widespread location of the re-
sources, the variable character of some RE electricity production
technologies and the close interaction between RE and biological2 The share of primary energy consumption is lower.
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Fig. 1. The analytical structure used to study the relationships between energy and security. Based on [14].
3 Attacks, for which the physical consequences are less profound, and for which it
is mainly economic or political losses at stake, would more suitably be classiﬁed as
belonging to economic and political risk factors.
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partly differ from those arising from fossil fuel-based energy sys-
tems. It is worth noting that in many studies; it is explicitly or
implicitly assumed that RE is typically a domestic resource (see e.g.
Refs. [7,9]), thereby reducing import dependence. Although this is
largely true for the current situation, it may be quite different in the
longer term if RE increases in line with the EU energy roadmap. In
that case many countries will not be able to manage with local
supply and will have to depend on energy imports (compare for
example the discussions on the Netherlands and Germany in Refs.
[12,13]).
In the following sections, the security aspects of RE are dis-
cussed following an analytical framework developed by Johansson
[14]. The discussion concentrates on bioenergy, hydro power, wind
power and solar energy (thermal and PV (photovoltaic)), which in
most scenarios appear to be the important RE alternatives for the
future. The security consequences of RE are described and
compared with those of the currently dominating fossil fuels and
nuclear power.
2. Relationship between energy and security
Previous studies provide a variety of deﬁnitions and ap-
proaches to energy security depending on their scope and sci-
entiﬁc background (see e.g. Refs. [15e20]). An effort to describe
the variety of perspectives was made by Ref. [14], who high-
lighted two approaches to energy and security that differ in
principle, namely whether the energy system is an object
exposed to security threats, or a subject generating or enhancing
insecurity (Fig. 1). The analytical framework in Ref. [14] was
developed to be applicable to any type of energy system and was
chosen as basis for the analysis in this article. The structure is
more inclusive than many other frameworks on energy security
and encompasses a variety of security and safety issues and po-
tential risk factors.
Within the energy system as an object approach, the focus lies
on securing the functionality of the energy system, enabling it to
provide the energy services demanded in society without major
interruptions or severe price effects (see e.g. Refs. [21,22]). These
aspects are usually included in the term security of supply. One
could also choose to take the perspective of the energy supplier
for which security of demand is essential for preserving stableincome, etc. Integrating the perspectives of the consumer and
supplier could be justiﬁed by their mutual, but differing, interests
in an efﬁciently functioning energy system.
In the security of supply side of the approach, the focus is on the
energy consumer, be it an individual, a nation or the global com-
munity. In this approach, considerations regarding long-term
resource issues and short and medium-term balance between
supply and demand are both of relevance, as is the adequacy and
functioning of transportation, transmission and distribution infra-
structure. Factors often used to qualify security of supply include
resource availability, import dependency, supplier reliability, di-
versity in energy resources, secure transit routes, infrastructure
reliability, etc. (cf. [23]).
The approach to the energy system as a subject generating or
enhancing insecurity can in turn be divided into three different
types of risk areas: Economic-political, technological and environ-
mental (Fig. 1).
Economic-political risk factors arise from the competition around
scarce and valuable resources, tensions, conﬂicts and violence
resulting from overly abundant resources (the so-called resource
curse), and the risk of the owner of a strategic resource using it as
tool for achieving political and economic advantage. A consequence
of the latter is that import dependency may appear as a negative
factor in the discourse. However, liberal international relations
theory presents a contrasting perspective and views interdepen-
dency as an important security-building factor (see e.g. Refs.
[24,25]). According to this theory, the more dependent countries
are on each other, themore secure theworldwill be, whichwill also
bring security to individual countries.
Technological risk factors are associated with the physical char-
acteristics of energy technologies, potentially leading to severe
negative consequences and threats to security in cases where the
system is not functioning as intended. This could be due to acci-
dents (see e.g. Ref. [26]), hostile attacks (e.g. on hydro dams or gas
or nuclear facilities)3 or the use of radioactive material for weapon
production or extortion.
Table 1
Electricity generated from renewable energy sources in 2010, globally and in the EU
[2].
Renewable energy
source
Electricity production
2010 world TWh
Electricity production
2010 EU TWh
Hydro power 3431 366
Biomass 331 142
Wind power 342 149
Geothermal 68 6
Solar (CSP, PV) 34 23
Other 1 1
B. Johansson / Energy 61 (2013) 598e605600The environmental risk factors category [14], includes those se-
curity threats to the environment that occur as an unintended but
well-known by-product of an otherwise efﬁciently functioning
energy system. These include environmental impacts from ex-
pected GHG (greenhouse gas) emissions (cf. [27]), threats to
biodiversity from the extraction of RE sources, and health threats
from air and water pollution.
Although the typology of energy and security presented in Fig. 1
can be helpful when analysing the security aspects of energy, it
should be noted that it is not possible to create a ﬁrm delimitation
from other policy arenas such as environmental policy and eco-
nomic policy. For example, the impact of energy use on the climate
is, with good reason, usually framed as an environmental or a
development issue rather than a security issue [28]. The aspects
analysed in this paper under a security umbrella could also be
studied in terms of sustainability, cf. for example [29] who deﬁnes
energy security as the “ability of an economy to provide sufﬁcient,
affordable and environmentally sustainable energy services so a to
maintain maximum welfare state”.3. Current use and future expansion of renewable energy
Today, global RE is dominated by biomass, followed by hydro
energy. Wind power has boomed during recent years, but is still far
behind in terms of share of total energy supply. Biomass is so far
mostly used for heating purposes, in developing countries often
through traditional and inefﬁcient technologies. In industrialised
countries, biomass is also used in large-scale applications (industry,
district heating and electricity) that are more technically advanced
in terms of both efﬁciency and pollution reduction. More reﬁned
fuels such as pellets and briquettes are also being developed and
used. For example, the use of wood pellets in Sweden tripled be-
tween 2000 and 2010 [30]. During recent years biomass-based
transportation fuels have increased rapidly in response to strong
policy instruments, but still contribute only a small fraction of the
consumption of biomass-based energy carriers, both globally and in
the EU [2].
Renewable sources used for electricity production interact
directly with fossil fuel technologies and nuclear power through
the electricity grid. Globally, hydro power dominates renewable
electricity production, but bioenergy and wind power also
contribute signiﬁcant shares of electricity production [2,31]. Solar
power, produced by PV cells and thermal power plants, is growing
rapidly but was in 2010 still producing less electricity than hydro,
wind and bioenergy, as it is still more costly than its alternatives, at
least in large-scale applications [32]. The costs for PV are, however,
falling rapidly due to high learning rates [32].4 Within the EU,4 Solar heating has historically performed better from an economic perspective,
but the relatively poor correlation between solar irradiation and heat demand often
prohibits solar heating from providing more than a fraction of energy demand.renewable electricity production is dominated by the same sources
as global production, although wind power and bioenergy provide
a more signiﬁcant share, Table 1
In scenarios which involve stringent mitigation of GHG emis-
sions, RE grows in signiﬁcance and, together with energy efﬁciency
improvements, is the most important mitigation option in many
studies (see e.g. Refs. [2,7,31]). Fossil fuels, together with CCS
(carbon capture and storage) and nuclear power, are also assumed
to provide signiﬁcant proportions in most studies. Researchers and
organisations have even developed scenarios in which all the en-
ergy demand is covered by RE [33e37].
In the frequently cited IEA (International Energy Agency)
450 ppm scenarios, RE will grow rapidly in the electricity sector to
provide almost half (47%) of the global electricity supply by 2035
[2]. In the EU, the level will be even higher (56%) in that scenario.
While hydro power will maintain its important role, other sources
such as wind, solar and biomass power will grow much more
rapidly. The use of bioenergy in most end-use sectors will also in-
crease signiﬁcantly during this period. According to the IEA
450 ppm scenario, the total global demand for bioenergy will
almost double during the period 2010e2035.
For the future, two major opposing trends can be discerned. On
the one hand, small-scale RE technologies, such as solar power
installed in buildings, are expected to expand. At the same time,
large-scale centralised solar and wind power plants are expected to
be developed for economic reasons. Progress has already been
made in this area. For example, the wind power turbines developed
in the beginning of the 1980s often rated only about 100 kW, while
those produced in recent years usually have a capacity of 1.5e
2.5 MW and are often grouped in wind power parks, with several
hundred MW of output [38]. Other visionary examples are large-
scale imports of solar electricity from North Africa to Europe (cf.
the Desertec concept), covering between 15 and 20% of EU energy
demand [39]. Although smaller in scale than fossil fuel systems,
biomass technologies can also have signiﬁcant advantages of scale
and the use of CCS, a technology attributed to fossil fuels in the past,
will become a signiﬁcant option for GHG mitigation (see e.g. Ref.
[40]).
Within the transportation sector, the choice of technology based
on RE is less evident. Today biomass-based transportation fuels are
the most important renewable alternative, and in 2010 they
contributed approximately 2% of global energy used for trans-
portation [2] (and in some areas like Brazil, the US, and the EU even
5). Electricity and hydrogen are interesting options that could be
produced from a variety of renewable energy sources but will
greatly depend on the success in developing technologies such as
electric or fuel cell-based vehicles. The chosen carrier will also
depend on the application and the demands of the various trans-
port modes, but biofuels, electricity and hydrogen have all
appeared frequently in discussion regarding long-term solutions
(see e.g. Refs. [31,41e43]).
4. Renewable energy and security aspects
Renewable energy can affect energy security in a number of
ways. In this section, these effects are brieﬂy discussed following
the framework presented in Fig.1. It is not possible to explore all the
various aspects involved in this short paper, but the discussion is
intended to show the variety of issues worth investigating. Thor-
ough investigations have already been carried out on some of these,
whereas in other areas information on many aspects is still lacking.5 According to [2], the biofuel shares of transportation energy in 2010 were 20, 4
and 4%, Brazil, the US and the EU, respectively.
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In the long term (>10 years), the main advantage of RE sources
from a security of supply perspective is that these energy sources
are based on energy ﬂows. In contrast, fossil fuels are based on
resources that can be seen as depletable stocks, although some of
the fossil resources are still very large and depletion therefore not
imminent.6 This means that with RE sources, it is possible to sustain
energy supply over the long term as long as the renewable re-
sources are utilised in a sustainable way. In the case of bioenergy
this means that harvest must not exceed growth or in other ways
contribute to the depletion of long-term production conditions.
Although these are rather self-evident conclusions, it is less clear
what conclusions can be drawn regarding feasible expansion of RE,
especially as biological resources are also used for other important
purposes such as food and ﬁbre production. Existing studies report
biomass potential values that vary widely [45e48].
Climate change is a factor that will have effect on energy supply
although the impact and can be both positive and negative. RE
sources are closely related to climate conditions and for this reason,
according to [49], it can be expected that climate change will affect
renewable energy sources more intensively than fossil ones. Ex-
amples of factors that will impact RE are changes in temperature,
wind patterns, cloudiness and the hydrological cycle. The optimal
design of future RE systems will depend on future climate and past
experience of climate conditions should therefore be used with
care when planning future RE systems [49e51].
In the medium term (1e10 years), the supply-demand balance
will be determined by investments in adequate supply, combined
with demand-reducing technologies and consumer behaviour. This
fact will hold true regardless of whether investments are diverted
to the fossil fuel market or the RE market. Furthermore, RE sources
are often integrated within the same system (e.g. electricity or
district heating system) as conventional resources, so investments
in these distribution systems will support both fossil fuel and RE
use. Thus, there seem to be many similarities between RE sources
and fossil fuel resources in the medium term.
However, other aspects of the energy system, such as diversity
and ﬂexibility, can be important for enabling the system to cope
with, or adapt to, price changes, etc. The impact of RE on diversity
depends on where in the transition phase the system is. Initially,
when the penetration of RE is low, diversity (in all its aspects as
deﬁned by Ref. [52]) will increase with increasing use of RE, but the
diversity advantages may be reduced when the systems have
become dominated by RE. In this regard, the balance between
various RE sources will be important. Furthermore, the importance
of diversity for reducing the vulnerability of the system to price
changes will depend on how correlated prices for various energy
sources are on the market (cf. [53]), and how vulnerable the study
entity (country, industry, household) is to ﬂuctuating prices. The
sensitivity to future energy prices could in many cases be less
pronounced for RE sources than for fossil fuels, as they often have
larger upfront costs than current fossil fuel-based plants (cf. [9]). In
this regard RE sources seem to bemore similar to nuclear power, for
which total production costs are only slightly dependent on the
price of nuclear fuel [54]. Although prices for REmight followglobal
fossil fuel prices, the effects on a speciﬁc national economy will
depend onwhether the wealth transfer of rising prices stays within
in the country or is transferred to exporting countries (cf. [53,55]).6 Sims et al. [44] estimate that the proven and probable reserves of oil and gas are
enough to last for decades and in the case of coal, centuries. The abundance of the
fossil resources is a potential problem from a climate change perspective.In the short-term perspective, the most signiﬁcant aspect of
security of supply is the expanded use of variable electricity pro-
duction, which could make it more difﬁcult to balance supply and
demand. In many aspects the variable electricity production pro-
vided by sources such as solar and wind power have similar char-
acteristics to electricity demand, so it could be fruitful to view
production as negative consumption and use similar methods to
handle production and consumption variations. The development
of methodologies for predicting electricity production (or negative
consumption) levels will thus be very important.
There are several technical alternatives for reducing the nega-
tive aspects of variable electricity production, such as installing
reserve capacity, increasing the spatial distribution of production
facilities, investing in new transmission lines, investing in elec-
tricity storage units such as batteries or pumping power, or utilising
storage in future electric vehicles [56e59]. The systems could gain
from the rapid development of information technology and new
businessmodels (see e.g. Refs. [60,61]). However, it should be noted
that smart grids could introduce new security threats, see e.g. Ref.
[62]. Large fractions of variable electricity production are possible
but carry some extra costs in addition to the direct costs (see e.g.
Refs. [63,64]). The dependence of the new energy systems on
weather conditions indicates that geographical diversiﬁcation
could be advantageous (see e.g. Refs. [65,66]), and thus energy in-
dependence less desirable. The smoothening of variable production
will take advantage of large-scale integration of energy systems.
Security of supply is not only dependent on balances between
supply and demand, but also on unexpected disturbances, technical
failures, antagonistic attacks, etc. In this case, the characteristics of
the technical facilities and transportation routes are determinants
of the risk of disturbances, while market structures and handling
strategies are important for determining how vulnerable a speciﬁc
system will be. Current oil and natural gas markets are charac-
terised by a few dominant supplying nations, a concentration that
is expected to grow even more in the future (see e.g. Ref. [67]). This
makes themarkets vulnerable to events in these nations and also to
disturbances (natural or antagonistic) to the transportation lines.
With increasing fractions of RE, this dominance will probably
decrease and the exposure to these countries will be reduced.
Natural gas can play a role as balancing variable renewable energy
production [2] and if so some of the above mentioned vulnerabil-
ities will remain. However, the natural gas quantities required in a
future EU electricity systemmainly based on renewable energy, are
expected to be much smaller than what is currently used for elec-
tricity production [7].
The scale of energy conversion plants (reﬁneries, electricity
production facilities, etc.) is usually larger for fossil fuel and nuclear
facilities, so technical failure, for whatever reason, would have a
greater impact for these than for more decentralised RE plants.
However, if RE sources are dependent on concentrated facilities or
transmission nodes (such as potentially from North African solar
power), new vulnerabilities will be built into the systems [68].
New biofuel transportation routes will most likely develop (cf.
[69]), with potential vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities may be
similar to those connected to current transports of fossil energy but
may differ in magnitude and the where they will occur geograph-
ically. Exactly what a globalised future biomass market would look
like and to what extent the resulting ﬂows would be vulnerable is
still an open question.
4.2. Renewable energy and security of demand
The expansion of RE at the expense of fossil fuels will have an
impact on fossil fuel markets and, consequently, could have an ef-
fect on security of demand for fossil fuel-rich countries. For
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which leads to efﬁciency improvements and diffusion of RE will
reduce oil prices, which in the short run could be negative for these
countries. On the other hand, with lower demand, depletion could
be slowed and therefore income could be spread over a longer
period. This is already a decision-making rule that is being used by
some oil-producing countries [67]. It is worth noting that some of
the oil-rich countries, e.g. Libya and Saudi Arabia, are also
geographically located in areas in which they could become major
exporters of energy carriers produced from solar energy.
Exporters of RE could develop a dependency on stable income,
but it is doubtful that any country will become as dependent on
energy income as current fossil fuel exporters, although this re-
quires further investigation. Bioenergy seems to be very competi-
tive in the former Soviet Union, East Asia, Oceania and parts of
Africa [69], but due to a combination of high productivity and/or
low population density, solar power and solar hydrogen production
are in many studies expected to be localised in areas with large
deserts or other low productivity land.
Although new important exporters of RE will appear, the
importance of the sector for a nation’s economy will depend on
several factors. First, it is not clear how large a fraction of the ﬁnal
income will stay in the exporting country, depending on the rela-
tive importance of imported technology and local labour. If most of
the income goes to external industries, the importance of the
technology for the local economy might be rather low. Second, the
possibility for any country to tap income from the system will
depend on the power relations between nations. Third, the net
income available for tapping will also depend on the relationship
between extraction costs and energy prices. One reason for the
large amounts of income in some Middle Eastern countries is the
large discrepancy between production costs (less than 20 USD/
barrel) and market prices (75-100 USD/barrel).
4.3. Renewable energy and economic and political risk factors
In general, RE sources are less concentrated and, to a greater or
lesser degree, available in all countries. This is an argument for
assuming a reduced risk of single countries being able to exert
pressure or inﬂuence on individual countries or groups of countries
in the way countries such as Russia are reported to do regarding gas
(see e.g. Refs. [70,71]) In many studies, energy independence is
credited with improving security, and for EU countries energy in-
dependence is expected to increase in systems with large fractions
of RE [7]. Border conﬂicts generated around valuable energy re-
sources would probably also be reduced, as a system mainly based
on RE is less dependent on concentrated resources, with the
possible exception of hydro power. The strategic importance of
areas such as the MENA (Middle East-North Africa), which has
historically steered the politics of countries such as the US, would in
that case decrease. One further aspect is that some RE sources
cannot be stored and therefore the possibilities to use these sources
as a strategic tool are reduced [68,72].
Lilliestam and Ellenbeck [73] analysed the potential risks to the
EU from the new interdependencies arising through large-scale
imports of renewable electricity from North Africa. By comparing
the relative importance of stable demand for energy to the supplier
and stable supply of energy for the user, those authors showed that
the EU can be vulnerable to coordinated political action from the
supply countries, whereas a single country has more to lose than
the EU from an action restricting the supply of solar electricity.
The risks of attacks by non-state actors on renewable electricity
production plants and transmission have been analysed by Ref.
[68], who argue that the vulnerability of power plants to attacks
varies among technologies. For example, offshore wind energy andPV technologies seem to be less vulnerable than onshore wind
energy and concentrated solar power. For electricity grids [68],
distinguish between physical and virtual attacks and conclude that
attacks on energy infrastructure by non-state actors cannot be
dismissed entirely, but would most likely remain rare and have a
limited impact. Grid lines are the most vulnerable component of
electricity infrastructure, but the impact of an attack would prob-
ably be short-lived [68].
The risk of tensions as a result of increasing use of RE will
depend on the ownership of the new technologies, the involvement
of local groupings in the development and the distribution of in-
come (cf. [68]). There could be an improvement compared with the
current fossil fuel systems, since the smaller scale of renewable
technologies would enable a wider group of local investors to enter
themarket. On the other hand, conﬂicts have already been reported
in relation to the biofuel market, where large-scale plantations are
growing in importance at the expense of small-scale farmers and
local communities [74,75]. Similar conﬂicts have been identiﬁed for
industrial tree plantations in general [76]. Land-grabbing has
become a catch-all term for the current explosion of (trans)national
commercial land transactions [77], which are connected not only to
biofuel use, but also to diversion of food products for domestic
consumption to export. Conﬂicts over land use are common and
several land-reform activists have been murdered [74]. On the
other hand, the demand for biofuels provides the producing
countries with new income that can possibly be used to support
economic development.
The increasing production of biomass for energy could reduce
the land available for food production and thus pose a threat to food
security (see e.g. Refs. [78,79]). The conﬂict between various uses of
land, and thus the future availability of land for bioenergy, will
depend on factors such as improvements in crop productivity and
future diets [45,80]. Increased demand for bioenergy could lead to
increasing food prices (see e.g. Refs. [81,82]), which in turn could
lead to threats to food security for poor groups that do not beneﬁt
from the increasing prices. This may lead to diverging effects for
different population groups within one and the same country,
whereby owners of land may gain from increasing prices whereas
consumers lose (see e.g. Ref. [80]). This could lead to increasing
tensions among those groups, potentially leading to new conﬂicts.
A new area of interest is the growing demand for scarce mate-
rials for use in key systems for utilising RE, such as tellurium,
ruthenium and indium for solar energy, lithium for batteries for
electric vehicles, platinum for fuel cell vehicles and neodymium
more recently expanding in modern wind power plants (see e.g.
Refs. [8,83]). Many of these resources are concentrated to a few
countries and have been highlighted as potential reasons for con-
ﬂict. However, although these resources can be very valuable, the
level of dependency varies and future dependency will depend on
the availability of substitutes. Some of these materials could be
substituted for by other, more abundant resources, but this may
come at an economic cost. The long-term supply of these metals
will also depend on the development of efﬁcient recycling systems.
4.4. Renewable energy systems and technological risk factors
Examples of important technological risk factors with current
fossil fuel systems are oil tanker accidents or accidents during oil
extraction (for example The Deepwater Horizon event in 2010). The
RE source with the greatest technological risks is probably hydro
power, where dam safety is a signiﬁcant issue. The energy amounts
stored in hydro dams are signiﬁcant and could have a severe
negative impact if damaged. However, accidental dam failure rates
have decreased signiﬁcantly over time due to a combined effect of
technological improvements and more stringent regulations [26].
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of 7, especially as an energy carrier produced from solar or wind
energy, harvesting the advantages that it provides in handling
variable electricity production (see e.g. Ref. [33]) and reducing the
cost of transportation of energy from distant areas. However,
hydrogen is explosive and thus poses an accident risk and a po-
tential target for hostile attacks. There is a vast body of literature on
safety issues associated with hydrogen and security and it is quite
clear that hydrogen systems will create new risks that will have to
be managed (see e.g. Refs. [84,85]).
4.5. Renewable energy and environmental risk factors
The environmental consequences of RE have been discussed in
depth in a vast number of studies and will only be touched upon
brieﬂy here. Climate change and security has been a growing
research ﬁeld during the past decade, with studies focussing on
national and human security (see e.g. Refs. [27,86]). Renewable
energy will generally lead to a reduced impact in terms of climate
change compared with fossil fuels as long as it is sustainably pro-
duced. Bioenergy produced in the wrong places and with inap-
propriate methods may, however, lead to some or all of the
advantages of RE being lost. Indirect effects may also appear if
arable land used for food production is transferred to energy pro-
duction. This might mean that food production moves to other
areas, leading to a chain reaction resulting in more intensive agri-
culture elsewhere, threats to areas with great biodiversity and
potential loss of carbon to the atmosphere, which would outweigh
some of the positive effects of fossil fuel substitution by biomass
(see e.g. Refs. [87,88]). The overall effects will depend on the in-
centives for improvements of productivity, developments on other
markets such as those for food and ﬁbre and the possibility to use
degraded land for marginal production increases instead of forest
land.
Renewable energy sources, with the exception of biomass, will
not only lead to reduced emissions of CO2 compared with fossil
fuels, but also to reductions in other air pollutants such as partic-
ulate matter, sulphur, nitrogen oxides and VOCs (volatile organic
compounds). In contrast, traditional use of biomass is a major
source of pollution in developing countries and also locally in some
industrialised countries such as Sweden. The energy carrier and
combustion technology used are key factors determining the actual
impact on air pollution from using biomass for RE production.
Potential negative impacts of increased use of bioenergy on
ecosystems have been highlighted during recent years (see e.g. Ref.
[89]), as well potential stress on water resources, as many bio-
energy production systems are based on irrigation. The impact on
biodiversity will depend on the scale of biomass exploitation and
the methodologies used for biomass extraction. Estimates of water
footprints for various energy sources show that biomass requires
signiﬁcantly more water than fossil fuels or than other RE sources
such as wind and solar [90]. Already today water resources are
scarce and with an expansion of bioenergy there would have to be
an increased focus on water conservation.
5. Concluding discussion
The above discussion shows that RE will affect security and
societal resilience in various ways. The impact will depend on the
type of energy resource, the system design and the institutions and
regulations surrounding the technology. This paper was of an7 Hydrogen is, however, not per se based on renewable energy but could be
produced from fossil fuels or nuclear power as well.explorative nature, so it was not possible to map the exact conse-
quences of a change to RE and their magnitude. However, the sorts
of security problems that may have to be addressed in a future with
a larger share of RE are presented. Some of these problems may be
handled within current governance frameworks, whereas others
may require the development of new governance approaches.
The main advantage of RE from a long-term energy security
perspective is the fact that it is based on ﬂows instead of
exhaustible stocks. This aspect is less important in the near-term, as
there are still signiﬁcant resources of fossil fuels available, but it will
grow in importance over-time. Furthermore, the exploitation rate
of the renewable resources is not unlimited and especially for
biomass there are important restrictions emanating from the need
to preserve long-term productivity and biodiversity as well as by
competing demands.
In general, having more RE in the system can increase its di-
versity, making it less sensitive to some types of disturbances. This
increase in diversity is relevant with regard to energy source and
supplier. Due to the fact that all countries possess some renewable
resources, the development of RE could secure at least some energy
supply even if the global system is under severe strain. However, for
economic and geographical reasons, many countries will base at
least parts of their use of renewable energy on imports which could
lead to new interdependencies.
Energy independence is often highlighted as a target in itself.
However, dependence on a single local supplier could be as sensi-
tive as dependence on a broader regional or global market. This is
especially true for RE resourceswhich depend on long-term climate
and short-term weather patterns. Increasing use of variable elec-
tricity would be helped by electricity system integration, as this
would enable the geographical variability of wind and sun to be
exploited. An ever-increasing fractions of RE in the system could
also affect institutional conditions. New technologies could gain
from or even require reformed pricing systems, affecting both de-
mand and supply in response to an increasingly ﬂuctuating supply
(see e.g. Refs. [91e93]). Furthermore, on a more general level en-
ergy independencemay provide less security than interdependencies
between states.
For RE and also for conventional systems, there will always be a
trade-off between security and economic efﬁciency. Security of
supply can usually be improved by having excess transmission and
distribution capacity and reserve production plants in district
heating systems and by investing in supplementary energy systems
such as combined heating systems for buildings and ﬂexible fuel
vehicles.
Streamlining and adapting renewable energy carriers to the
current fossil fuel-based systems is a feasible strategy for expand-
ing RE, but as a consequence will make RE markets dependent on
parallel fossil fuel markets. Although the price of locally produced
renewable energy cannot be sheltered from developments on the
global energy market, the local economy could be less sensitive as
the extra costs for energy consumers in the area could at least
partly be balanced by larger income streams. Furthermore,
renewable energy will be at least as dependent on efﬁciently
functioning technological systems as conventional energy, espe-
cially as RE is seen as especially well-suited for electricity produc-
tion in many scenarios (see e.g. Ref. [7]).
The income aspect could be of interest when discussing the
advantages and disadvantages of importing biomass from devel-
oping countries and the potential conﬂict with food security.
Although the price of food products and land may rise owing to
increasing demand for biofuels, all other things being equal this
will also give rise to new income for the population. As an ultimate
end, it is perhaps not advisable to keep food prices low, as this may
encourage low efﬁciency in the food system, leading to higher
B. Johansson / Energy 61 (2013) 598e605604demand for agricultural land and increased strain on ecosystems.
Instead, it could be more important to create adequate institutions
that ensure that populations are provided with resources to buy
food and other necessities.
Institutions will also be essential to prevent biofuels having
negative effects on biodiversity and long-term production condi-
tions. These effects are site-speciﬁc and are probably best governed
on a local basis. However, the necessary local regulations will have
to be connected to global governance systems, since the conse-
quences are global, and it might be justiﬁable to redirect some of
the costs for the restrictions occurring in developing countries to
developed countries.
Although RE can improve energy diversity in the short term, it
seems that it is mostly the lower impact on climate change and the
longer-term need to depend on ﬂowing resources that will drive
the change to renewable resources. For economic reasons and to
minimise the potential stress on biological resources, it will be
essential to use natural resources efﬁciently. Therefore, energy ef-
ﬁciencymeasures will be as important in systems heavily reliant on
RE as in current systems dominated by fossil fuels.
The typology used in this study (Fig. 1) proved useful for map-
ping the various security aspects of RE but, as with most frame-
works and typologies, there are difﬁculties in categorising complex
issues under a certain label. For example, terrorist attacks on en-
ergy facilities could be seen as a security of supply issue if the focus
is on the negative impact on the energy market; as a technological
risk factor if the focus is mainly on the physical threats (e.g. from an
attack on a hydro dam); or as an economic-political risk factor if the
intention of the attackers is mainly to create economic or political
damage. Similarly, the complex ﬁeld of food security ﬁts well into
the economic-political risk category if the issue is seenmainly as an
economic problem, for example that poor groups cannot afford
rising food prices. Threats to food security that are mainly viewed
as a result of land degradation and negative impacts of climate
change would better ﬁt into the environmental risk category,
however. Bearing these ambiguities in mind, the typology pre-
sented here can still help structure the security aspects of RE in a
useful way.
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